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OPINION OF THE COURT 
 
COWEN, Circuit Judge. 
 
This appeal arises from the order of the District Court for 
the District of the Virgin Islands granting the defendants' 
motion to suppress evidence resulting from the Coast 
Guard's warrantless search of the M/V Mona Queen in the 
British Virgin Islands. The government contends that the 
district court erred in suppressing the evidence obtained 
from the warrantless search because, inter alia, a 
warrantless search in a foreign country does not violate the 
Fourth Amendment. 
 
We conclude that the Coast Guard possessed probable 
cause to search the Mona Queen and that no warrant was 
required since searches of ships in general fall within the 
exigent circumstances exception to the Fourth 
Amendment's warrant requirement. As a result of the Coast 
Guard satisfying the probable cause standard, we have no 
need to ascertain whether the Fourth Amendment actually 
applies to searches by U.S. law enforcement agents of U.S. 
citizens' property in foreign countries, whether a lower 
standard is required for such searches, and whether such 
searches require a warrant. Accordingly, the evidence 
obtained by the Coast Guard's warrantless search is 
admissible. We will reverse the order of the district court 
and remand for further proceedings. 
 
I. 
 
At the time of the events giving rise to this appeal, Clifton 
Ashley Boynes, Sr. (Boynes), was captain of the M/V Mona 
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Queen and sole owner of Interisland Boat Services 
(Interisland), which operates a ferry service within the U.S. 
Virgin Islands under a U.S. Coast Guard certificate of 
inspection. On the morning of February 1, 1995, Boynes 
was at the Red Hook ferry dock preparing the Mona Queen 
for its 6:30 a.m. run to Caneel Bay, St. John. 
 
At approximately 6:30 a.m., two Coast Guard officers 
patrolling Red Hook Harbor, Lt. Keith Janssen and BMC 
Salvatore Piazza, observed a dark brown substanceflowing 
from the Mona Queen's starboard-side overboard bilge 
discharge fitting. Janssen took samples of the substance 
from the discharge fitting and from the sheen of the Mona 
Queen's wake, but the officers could not complete their 
investigation at that time because their craft developed 
engine trouble. 
 
Later in the morning, Piazza sent a fax to Boynes stating 
that the Coast Guard was investigating a pollution incident 
involving the Mona Queen, and the fax included a federal 
letter of interest. The fax instructed Boynes to bring the 
Mona Queen to the Marine Safety Detachment Office in St. 
Thomas at 1:00 p.m. that day. Three hours before the 
scheduled inspection, Janssen and Piazza encountered the 
Mona Queen at the Red Hook ferry dock and approached 
Boynes, who acknowledged receiving the fax. The officers 
requested permission from Boynes to board the Mona 
Queen and inspect the engine room, and Boynes consented. 
While inspecting the engine room, Janssen and Piazza 
found approximately fifty gallons of oil on thefloor in the 
front of the engine room measuring seven inches deep. The 
officers also found a diesel oil leak on a fuel line. However, 
they did not take a sample of the various leaking 
substances since they lacked a sample jar. As a result of 
the consensual search, Janssen revoked the Mona Queen's 
certificate of inspection and ordered repair of the leaks and 
removal of the fuel and oil. The officers also reminded 
Boynes to bring his vessel to the Marine Safety Detachment 
Office in St. Thomas at 1:00 p.m. that day. 
 
Boynes arrived at the Marine Safety Detachment Office at 
1:20 p.m. without the Mona Queen, which he said was in 
Nanny Cay, a shipyard in the British Virgin Islands. Piazza 
read Boynes his Miranda rights, and, subsequently, Boynes 
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signed a form waiving his Miranda rights. Boynes then gave 
a voluntary statement regarding the pollution incident. 
Boynes speculated that someone in the vessel wheelhouse 
accidentally flipped the switch controlling the bilge pump. 
Upon hearing that the Mona Queen was under repair in the 
British Virgin Islands, the officers were concerned that 
repairs on the boat would be accomplished before they had 
the opportunity to take samples of the leaking substances. 
The officers instructed Boynes to discontinue further repair 
of the Mona Queen and to meet them at the boat the 
following morning so that they could gather evidence and 
photograph the vessel. 
 
On the morning of February 2, 1995, Piazza and his 
supervisor, Lt. Scruggs, arrived at the location of the Mona 
Queen at drydock in the Nanny Cay shipyard in the British 
Virgin Islands. Boynes, however, was not at the appointed 
meeting-place, nor was a representative of Interisland. The 
officers boarded the Mona Queen and proceeded to gather 
evidence from the vessel. They did not have a search 
warrant. Scruggs videotaped and Piazza photographed the 
interior and exterior of the Mona Queen including the bilge 
system, and they tried to simulate a passenger accidentally 
flipping the bilge control switch as Boynes had described. 
The officers also observed oil around the starboard 
discharge hose, and they gathered a sample of the oily 
residue in the bilge. 
 
Boynes and Interisland were indicted in the District 
Court for the District of the Virgin Islands for knowingly 
discharging oil into U.S. waters in violation of 33 U.S.C. 
SS 1319(c)(2)(A), 1321(b)(3) (1994). Theyfiled a joint motion 
to suppress Boynes's statements at the Marine Safety 
Detachment Office and the evidence collected by the officers 
during their warrantless search of the Mona Queen. 
Following an evidentiary hearing, the district court entered 
an order admitting Boynes's statements but suppressing 
the evidence collected during the warrantless search in the 
British Virgin Islands. This appeal followed. 
 
II. 
 
Our jurisdiction arises pursuant to 18 U.S.C. S 3731 
(1994). We will affirm the district court's factual 
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determinations unless clearly erroneous. We exercise 
plenary review over the district court's interpretation of 
legal principles and its application of those legal principles 
to the facts of the case. See Universal Minerals, Inc. v. C.A. 
Hughes & Co., 669 F.2d 98, 103 (3d Cir. 1981). 
 
III. 
 
While the search of the Mona Queen occurred in the 
British Virgin Islands, the government does not contest the 
applicability of the Fourth Amendment but rather assumes 
that the Fourth Amendment is applicable to searches by 
U.S. law enforcement officials of U.S. citizens in foreign 
countries. However, we have no need to address the 
applicability of the Fourth Amendment since we determine 
that the Coast Guard possessed probable cause to search 
the Mona Queen and thus would satisfy the Fourth 
Amendment if it applies. Furthermore, even if the Fourth 
Amendment applies, the Coast Guard would not have 
needed a warrant due to exigent circumstances arising from 
the ship's mobility.1 
 
A. 
 
The government does not argue that the Fourth 
Amendment2 is inapplicable to searches of U.S. citizens in 
foreign countries by U.S. law enforcement officials.3 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
1. Since the Coast Guard possessed probable cause prior to searching 
the Mona Queen in the British Virgin Islands, we have no need to 
ascertain the applicability of 14 U.S.C. S 89(a) (1994), which permits a 
warrantless search of vessels based upon the less stringent standard of 
reasonable suspicion. 
 
2. The Fourth Amendment reads: 
 
        The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, 
       papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, 
       shall not be violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon 
       probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly 
       describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to 
be 
       seized. 
 
U.S. Const. amend. IV. 
 
3. In Reid v. Covert, 354 U.S. 1, 77 S. Ct. 1222 (1957), a plurality 
announced the principle that the Bill of Rights applies to U.S. citizens 
in 
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Assuming arguendo that the Fourth Amendment does apply 
and that the Fourth Amendment requires probable cause 
for such searches, the Coast Guard officers certainly 
possessed probable cause to search the Mona Queen while 
it underwent repair in the British Virgin Islands. We have 
defined probable cause as follows: 
 
       Probable cause is "defined in terms of facts and 
       circumstances `sufficient to warrant a prudent man in 
       believing that the [suspect] had committed or was 
       committing an offense.' " Gerstein v. Pugh, 420 U.S. 
       103, 111, 95 S. Ct. 854, 862, 43 L. Ed.2d 54 (1975) 
       (quoting Beck v. Ohio, 379 U.S. 89, 91, 85 S. Ct. 223, 
       225-26, 13 L. Ed.2d 142 (1964)). This standard is 
       meant to " `safeguard citizens from rash and 
       unreasonable interferences with privacy' " and to 
       provide "leeway for enforcing the law in the 
       community's protection." Id. at 112, 95 S. Ct. at 862 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
foreign countries. Id. at 5-6, 77 S. Ct. at 1225. Two other justices 
"resolved the case on much narrower grounds than the plurality and 
declined even to hold that United States citizens were entitled to the 
full 
range of constitutional protections in all overseas criminal 
prosecutions." 
United States v. Verdugo-Urquidez, 494 U.S. 259, 270, 110 S. Ct. 1056, 
1063 (1990). Verdugo dealt with the search of a Mexican citizen's 
residence in Mexico, and the Supreme Court, in the course of its 
analysis, noted that Reid's holding only recognizes the Fifth and Sixth 
Amendments, not the Fourth, as applying to U.S. citizens in foreign 
countries. However, two of the six justices in the Verdugo majority 
coalition did not join the other four justices' reasoning completely. 
Justice Stevens authored a concurrence in which he stated that he did 
not agree with the "sweeping" nature of the opinion. Verdugo, 494 U.S. 
at 279, 110 S. Ct. at 1068 (Stevens, J., concurring) ("I do not believe 
the 
Warrant Clause has any application to searches of noncitizens' homes in 
foreign jurisdictions" (emphasis added)). Justice Kennedy joined the 
majority but also authored a concurrence to clarify his views, and in that 
concurrence he stated, "The rights of a citizen, as to whom the United 
States has continuing obligations, are not presented by this case." Id. at 
278, 110 S. Ct. at 1068 (Kennedy, J., concurring). As a result, the 
Supreme Court's Verdugo decision cannot be interpreted to suspend the 
warrant requirement nor to enunciate a standard lower than probable 
cause for searches by U.S. law enforcement officials of U.S. citizens' 
property abroad. 
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       (quoting Brinegar v. United States, 338 U.S. 160, 176, 
       69 S. Ct. 1302, 1311, 93 L. Ed. 1879 (1949)). 
 
Sharrar v. Felsing, 128 F.3d 810, 817-18 (3d. Cir. 1997). 
Here, the Coast Guard officers witnessed the discharge of a 
dark substance from the Mona Queen, and a subsequent 
consensual search of the engine room revealed an overflow 
of oil and a leak in a fuel line. Accordingly, the Coast Guard 
officers reasonably believed that another search of the 
Mona Queen would result in the collection of further 
evidence that the Mona Queen's bilge discharge violated 
American environmental statutes. In sum, the Coast Guard 
officers had probable cause to search the Mona Queen in 
the British Virgin Islands. The existence of probable cause 
makes unnecessary our need to ascertain whether the 
Fourth Amendment applies to searches of U.S. citizen's 
property in foreign countries by U.S. law enforcement 
officials and whether the probable cause standard, or some 
lower standard, governs such cases. Cf. United States v. 
Wright-Barker, 784 F.2d 161, 176 n.14 (3d Cir. 1986) (the 
court "need not decide whether any lesser standard is 
constitutionally permissible" because law enforcement 
officials satisfied a more stringent standard when justifying 
their search of a ship). 
 
B. 
 
Assuming arguendo that the Fourth Amendment does 
govern searches of U.S. citizens in foreign countries by U.S. 
law enforcement officials, we have no need to ascertain 
whether a warrant is required in such circumstances 4 
since, in general Fourth Amendment jurisprudence, 
searches of vessels fall within the exigent circumstances 
exception to the warrant requirement. In Carroll v. United 
States, 267 U.S. 132, 45 S. Ct. 280 (1925), the Supreme 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
4. The government argues that considerations of practicality should lead 
us to conclude that the warrant requirement is inapplicable to searches 
of U.S. citizens' property in foreign countries by U.S. law enforcement 
officials. Specifically, the government argues that Federal Rule of 
Criminal Procedure 41(a), which governs the issuance of warrants, does 
not provide for searches in foreign countries. We do not rule on the 
merits of this argument. 
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Court held that, "practically since the beginning of the 
government," a warrant has not been required for searches 
of ships and automobiles "because the vehicle can be 
quickly moved out of the locality or jurisdiction in which 
the warrant must be sought." Id. at 153, 45 S. Ct. at 285; 
see Chambers v. Maroney, 399 U.S. 42, 46-52, 90 S. Ct. 
1975, 1978-81 (1970) (explicating the automobile exception 
and collecting cases). The seaworthiness of the Mona 
Queen gave rise to the risk of flight, meaning that the Coast 
Guard officers were justified by exigent circumstances in 
conducting a warrantless search of the vessel. See United 
States v. Bain, 736 F.2d 1480, 1488 (11th Cir. 1984) 
("mobility of the [docked] vessel was an exigent 
circumstance justifying an immediate search"); United 
States v. Weinrich, 586 F.2d 481, 492-93 (5th Cir. 1978) 
(the "automobile exception" justifies not requiring a warrant 
for searches of ships); United States v. Lingenfelter, 997 
F.2d 632, 640-41 (9th Cir. 1993) (a boat in drydock could 
be seized by virtue of the automobile exception since the 
boat could be returned to the water and then flee). 
 
IV. 
 
For the foregoing reasons, we will reverse the August 20, 
1997, order of the district court suppressing evidence from 
the Coast Guard's search of the Mona Queen in the British 
Virgin Islands. We will remand the case for further 
proceedings. 
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